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The constitutional and political developments in Hungary in the last few years have stirred a lot of controversies
and also raised significant academic attention. This blog has provided not only a wonderful forum for an
exchange of different views, but it has also produced original and thought-provoking proposals for tackling the
Hungarian problem.
However, the “reverse Solange” idea, the call for the establishment of a special Copenhagen Commission, for a
straightforward supremacy of the Charter and other insightful proposals, all appear to be addressing the
Hungarian dilemma from within the constitutional register. This is, of course, a legitimate choice, but it is neither
exclusive nor neutral.
As the Lindseth-Halberstam exchange in particular demonstrated, the answers sketched for the resolution of the
Hungarian dilemma are heavily dependent on the assumed or the desired character of the European Union. 
Without engaging with the merits of the constitutional account of the European Union and without necessarily
taking sides, I would like to use this post to explore – out of intellectual curiosity – the Hungarian dilemma from a
pluralist perspective.
The European Union as a pluralist entity is a union (der Bund). It is composed of autonomous national and
supranational constitutional sites, which form a non-hierachical common whole, founded on a relational principle
of primacy, rather than supremacy. In a pluralist Union boundaries, jurisdictions and competences matter. They
do so not merely because of the formal reasons (eg since the Treaty stipulates so), but because they are a
guarantee and a sign of respect for autonomous development: for a veritable self-government of the Union’s
constituent entities.
Therefore not every constitutional conflict inside a Member State is automatically turned into a supranational EU
affair. A national constitutional conflict can trigger an EU reaction, if it causes negative externalities: be it to the
other Member States, to the EU or to the EU citizens.  It should also lead to the EU reaction when a Member
State violates the normative spirit of pluralism, by undermining the double commitment: to the plurality and to the
common whole, both at the same time.
The EU’s intervention should be therefore exceptional, rather than a rule, and it should be exercised with self-
restraint too. This is so for three reasons: the legal-jurisdictional; the reasons related to substantive democratic
legitimacy; and the reasons related to the Union’s pluralist character.
First, the Union is based on the principle of conferral of powers. The EU can only act when it is authorized to do
so. It can therefore start an (legal) action against a Member State only in explicitly enumerated cases.
Second, the EU has traditionally suffered from a democratic deficit. This indicates that it lacks not only strong
legal grounds for the intervention against the Member States, but also substantive legitimacy to do so. In contrast
with the classical federal states, such as the USA or Germany, the locus of democratic legitimacy in the EU still
rests on the national rather than on the supranational level. Therefore, if in a classical federal system a state
level is looked upon with suspicion, it might be still the other way around in the EU.
Third, the Union is a legally pluralist entity because of the value pluralism that it embodies. Legal orders as forms
shield different understandings of the substance of the values in the constituent entities of the Union. Following
the pluralist understanding, there is no value unity or uniformity in the Union. A great majority of the fundamental
constitutional values is shared, but they are not identical or homogeneous across the Union. Even if nominally
the same, they are – due to each entity’s distinctive episteme – understood and practiced differently.
In other words, pluralism allows to each entity of a pluralist construction to strike its own balance of fundamental
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values. Simultaneously, each entity is entitled to its own irreducible epistemic core, to its own constitutional
identity, which is unamendable or non-derogable lest the entity’s autonomous character is lost. Moreover, in a
pluralist constellation there is also no ultimate authority to decide for all the entities involved on a single correct
balance of fundamental values or on the ultimate suitability of a given constitutional settlement.
The implications of this are the following. In case of a Member State purely internal constitutional conflict the EU
should first approach it with a degree of trust that a national polity is able to resolve it by itself. This is after all its
right if the autonomy of a polity shall preserve any meaning. Only when the conflict creates externalities or when
it affects the alleged fundamentals of a constitutional order, the EU can and sometimes indeed should act.
In doing so, its measures should be guided by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. They should
match the gravity of the alleged national violation. The measures should be used incrementally: ranging from the
least to the most stringent ones. If these were depicted as on a continuum, they should consist of soft diplomatic
measures, political pressures, initiation of legal proceedings, actual filing of applications before the CJEU,
economic sanctions, suspension of voting rights.
Indeed, the pluralist vision allows for an integral approach to sanctioning a Member State, but this must be done
in accordance with the law and, more broadly, in accordance with the pluralist character of the Union. Any EU
intervention must be taken with a reminder that the EU too lacks legal powers; that it lacks legitimacy; that there
should be no uniform constitutional model across the Union and that even the most fundamental constitutional
values might be legitimately understood and practiced differently in different Member States.
A pluralist vision therefore rejects the extension of the EU competences beyond the enumerated powers. Indeed,
as argued by Daniel Thym, there should be no more room for the integration by stealth, as it was practiced in
the 1960s and 1970s. As the union is a pluralist entity, the Member States have to be taken seriously. The textual
constraints to which they have subjected the EU institutions should be heeded. The Court should be aware of its
institutional limits. The Commission should act in accordance with the law. Any action taken by the European
Parliament should be conducted with the political divisiveness of the situation in mind. But once again, in purely
internal situations it should be first for the national political and overall constitutional process to find the right
answers.
However, having said that, the pluralist nature of the Union should not used by the recalcitrant Member State as
an excuse for its measures, corrosive of the fundamental constitutional values. Pluralism leaves no room for
complacency, for self-sufficiency, for self-closure, but it requires the ethics of a dialectic open-self. Irrespective of
the cause of a constitutional conflict inside a Member State, its government or a ruling coalition has to be able to
justify it in a dialogue with the domestic opposition as well with its counterparts in the Union. In this process of
justification, the Member State (actually its governing coalition) must genuinely consider the counter-arguments
and be open to reconsider its own position and to amend it.
In other words, any Member State, which in defence of its own constitutional autonomy (even identity), invokes
the pluralist structure of the Union, it can only do so after it has heeded pluralism inside its own constitutional
polity. In that way, pluralism can endogenously create the environment constructive of a sound national
constitutional development. This is different from the constitutionalist account that in a statist-federalist manner
imposes (or creates an impression of imposition) of “foreign” constitutional values top-down.
However, as the historical experience of failed unions teaches us, pluralism is a demanding normative order,
since it always (in most abstract terms) oscillates between the openness to the other and the complacent self-
closure. If a country, such as Hungary, indeed decides for a slide into authoritarianism, as alleged and feared by
many, this will reveal that it has given up on a normative spirit of pluralism.
In such a case, there are not many alternatives left. Pluralism may be reclaimed through the national political
process. It can be, indeed, imposed top down by the EU. Yet, this is a monist, constitutional solution which
teaches a Member State a lesson in “the right” pluralism, while the latter has given up its own autonomous
pluralist self. And finally, such a country can leave a pluralist entity and continue in all respects a monistic and
therefore ever more authoritarian journey.
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Obviously, the first alternative is the best solution. Pluralism is either endogenous or it makes no sense. If the
European Union is to remain a pluralist entity – the EU, the Member States, and in particular Hungary, should be
aware of the fragility of its construction and act accordingly. If they do not, the system will be either
constitutionalized top-down or subject to disintegration. In either way something of great importance to the
European project will be lost.
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